Fragile truce in Nagorno Karabakh: another front of tension between Turkey, Iran and Russia after the Syrian one
The war for Nagorno Karabakh has for now ended with a ceasefire which, according to leading experts, marks a victory for Azerbaijan. In this conflict Baku proved capable of retaking the Khudaferin bridge, in the Jabraiyl Region on the border with Iran, and above all the city of Sushi, for years inhabited mainly by Azeris and considered the gateway to the conquest of the capital of Karabakh .
The agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan was promoted by Russia, but this mediation – as The Moscow Times acknowledged – should not be read as a Russian victory, but as the admission of defeat. Putin, as known, supported Armenia and not only had to suffer the Azerbaijani offensive supported by Turkey, but also the downing of an MI-24 helicopter on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In fact, therefore, Moscow will be increasingly forced into its backyard and, as in the Middle East, to find cohabitation with Ankara.
It is not known how the Nagorno Karabakh issue will evolve, but there are reasons to believe that the ceasefire will not last long. Should the bleak prediction prove correct, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan could increasingly resemble the war between Iraq and Iran . A war that broke out over the Shatt al-Arab, the navigable river near the city of Basra, whose territorial jurisdiction was disputed between Baghdad and Tehran.
As happened on that sad occasion, also in the case of Nagorno Karabakh we will probably see constant missile launches between the two warring states, which will see civilian populations as the first victims. The so-called "war of the cities" was one of the saddest pages of the conflict between Iraq and Iran: between 1984 and 1987, Saddam Hussein ordered indiscriminate missile attacks against 11 Iranian cities, with the aim of morally destroying the enemy. The Iranians reacted, developing their missile arsenal, managing to respond, albeit with less precision. The civilian deaths of this madness are probably still incalculable today.
Again: during the conflict with Iraq, Iran created and armed proxy armed groups such as the Badr organization, made up of Iraqi Shiites, in order to fight Saddam Hussein's regime from within. Similarly, in the now classic logic of proxy war of which the Islamic Republic has sadly shown itself to be a master, Turkey has begun to send Sunni jihadists from the conflict in Syria to Nagorno Karabakh. A tactic condemned by Iranian President Rouhani, but we repeat, it was Tehran itself that exported to the world. It should also be said that Armenia itself has not been outdone, attracting Orthodox militiamen, especially linked to the Armenian diaspora in the world.
Obviously, a resumption of the conflict would increase the chances of its regional enlargement. As mentioned above, Nargono Karabakh, despite its small territorial size, has an enormous capacity to generate a clash between large and medium powers, such as Turkey, Russia and Iran itself.
As for the Islamic Republic, it considers the Azerbaijani presence on its border a direct threat to national security. This for a twofold reason: first of all for Iranian territorial integrity. In fact, Tehran fears that Azerbaijani victories will stir up the Iranian Azerbaijani component, which has already expressed dissatisfaction with the central government several times (despite Khamenei himself being of Azerbaijani origin). It is no coincidence that just after the reconquest of the Khudaferin bridge, the leaders of the Iranian Pasdaran visited the border and several videos were posted on social media showing the transfer of weapons and military vehicles to the Iranian Azerbaijan Province. Those videos for several observers demonstrated Iranian military support for Armenia and caused the protests of the Iranian Azeri. Following several demonstrations , Tehran had to stop sending weapons to Yerevan.
Linked to this internal aspect is the external one. Turkey, Iran and Russia have met and clashed for years, especially in the conflict in Syria. Despite years of conflict and negotiations, the three actors have not yet managed to find a balance of cohabitation. In fact, stable divisions of territorial influences and mutual trust never corresponded to ceasefires. This is why, in the silence of the ceasefire, weapons will certainly continue to arrive clandestinely not only to the Azerbaijani and Armenian governments, but also to the various militias in the field. In this sense, while preaching the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, it is quite foreseeable that Iran will be in the front row in supporting the Armenian militias , in order to be able to weaken, when necessary, Turkish rivals. An action that this time however Tehran will have to carry out with greater discretion, probably entrusting it only to the channels of the Qods Force.
The post Fragile truce in Nagorno Karabakh: another front of tension between Turkey, Iran and Russia after the Syrian one appeared first on Atlantico Quotidiano .
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Atlantico Quotidiano at the URL http://www.atlanticoquotidiano.it/quotidiano/fragile-tregua-in-nagorno-karabakh-un-altro-fronte-di-tensione-tra-turchia-iran-e-russia-dopo-quello-siriano/ on Fri, 13 Nov 2020 03:41:00 +0000.