Here are the (economic) reasons for the protests in Iran
What is happening in Iran? What are the economic causes of the protests? And what are the political and social perspectives? Start Magazine conversation with Nicola Pedde, director of the Institute for Global Studies, expert on Iran
Iran is grappling with a new wave of protests triggered by a very specific fact : the murder by the "police of morality" of a young woman who had the only mistake of being poorly veiled.
In the last hours , with the demonstrations entering the tenth day, the tension has skyrocketed, with a toll of the repression calculated in several dozen deaths among which the actual execution of a second young woman who had become the symbol of the protests stands out.
But what is the real dimension of a movement that appears without a guide and therefore substantially spontaneous. What are the root causes behind the descent into the streets of so many Iranian youths? And how heavy is the malaise for an economic situation grappling with the stranglehold of Western sanctions?
To take stock and to propose answers that look at the phenomenon beyond the surface, Start Magazine interviewed the director of the Institute for Global Studies Nicola Pedde, in a conversation that from the specific aspects of the ongoing story extended the horizon to the picture political, social and economic general of Iran.
Dr. Pedde, days have passed since Mahsa Amini's funeral, the hotbed of the first protests, and since then the demonstrations have not stopped. What is happening in Iran? Do you want to give us the real proportions of what is happening?
At this moment it is difficult to have a perception of the real dimension of the protest. The strong control of the internet and the blocking of numerous servers have severely limited communications through social media, which are the main communication vehicle for young Iranians. So having the exact size right now is somewhat difficult. Surely it is a protest demonstration that affects the whole country or a part of the country, especially urban areas. It is a manifestation widely attended by young people, by boys and girls; it is a new phase of protest that intervenes as a reaction to what was like the straw that broke the camel's back The dimension of Iranian discontent is large and the dimension of youth discontent is perhaps even wider than the general one. Young people under the age of 35 represent 75% of the Iranian population; therefore the set of repressive policies by the government, social policies that have never been accepted and economic crisis, unemployment has led to an explosive climate as we have already seen in recent months on the occasion of the protests for the management of water resources in the country .
Was Mahsa's death just the trigger for a smoldering protest?
The murder of Mahsa Amini by the police was the element that gave the boys the courage to go down the street, to protest above all against all those rules that have long been the subject of general hostility on the part of young Iranians, are always been badly tolerated and respected up to a certain point. There has been a fairly fluctuating trend on the part of the authorities in the management, above all, of social and customs issues. What is happening now is a protest that is not only extensive but also violent and this is the element that worries the government, because clearly the management of the protest through strong repression risks fueling it strongly not only in terms of proportions but also of intensity. , in a very critical phase for the authorities of the Islamic republic.
What differences can be glimpsed between today's demonstrations and the previous cycles of protests that have taken place in the country?
Iran has gone through a long cycle of protests and demonstrations. Let's not forget that there was a revolution between 1978 and 1979; Iran is therefore a country that tends to cyclically manifest its discontent, its dissent towards the authorities through periodic waves of protest. The most important ones that have characterized the history of the Islamic Republic are certainly those of the green wave of 2009, the subsequent protests for the presidential elections at the end of Ahmadinejad's mandate. This latest wave of protest has different characteristics: it is not a purely political protest linked to an electoral factor, it is not a protest linked to the result of parliamentary or presidential elections but it is a broader protest that starts from the assumption of strong opposition to these customs norms that were imposed with the Islamic revolution and yet extend not only geographically but also to a much wider spectrum of the population.
Is there any guidance behind these protests?
A continuity between the manifestations of the past and the one in progress is the absence of leadership, of a guide; there is no real movement driving this protest. And this could be the element of weakness, the element that, partly under the pressure of the authorities, partly due to the lack of a propulsive capacity, leads, as on previous occasions, the dimension of the protest to go out and return. Much will depend on the kind of reaction there is from the authorities. It is clear that an increase in violence, especially an increase in the number of deaths which are now estimated to be several dozen, could lead not only to an increase in the intensity of this protest but also to the creation of a control room, a sort of guide. policy that in this case could make a difference.
What is the "police of morality"? Who is it formed by and how does it exercise the violence that even former President Rouhani was accused of?
The "police of morality", which in more technical terms are called the "driving patrols", are units of the police forces that depend on the Ministry of the Interior which have the task of supervising compliance with Islamic principles in a wide context. Certainly the best known and most important one at this time is that on clothing, therefore on verifying compliance with the dress rules indicated by the religious authorities, enforcing them and therefore also exercising repressive action. They are usually made up of mixed units of police officers or female police officers who then physically proceed to arrest or search the arrested women. The vast majority of cases they deal with concern women's clothing; it is rare to see these patrols stop boys or men to challenge clothing violations. They are usually located in the cities, in the busiest streets, in aggregation centers such as shopping centers, cinemas and similar places and they follow very vague indications on clothing, demeanor and the need to cover the head with a hijab or a chador, that is, with a veil that actually covers the entire hair and then continues with a sort of tunic on the body. So it is very arbitrary what kind of action these units can carry out on stopped.
But former President Rouhani had openly criticized the work of the police of morality.
On several occasions the action of these units has been contained in the more recent history of Iran by the reformist administrations and in particular by the government of Hassan Rouhani. In 2017, the police chief said openly that he would no longer proceed to arrest and report to the court, specifying that he would try to do only training courses with which to explain to the boys how they should dress correctly according to Islamic principles. . Clearly today, with the new Raisi presidency and with a parliament that was elected the year before sanctioning the victory of the conservative forces, the prescriptions on social behavior and clothing have again become the subject of a more restrictive policy by the government. These units are strongly disliked by young people, are highly criticized and are one of the expressions of government institutions that is most hated by Iranian youth.
How much does the factor of economic discontent weigh on the recent wave of protests? How is the Iranian economy doing right now?
Economic discontent is certainly one of the main elements of this protest in the sense that certainly the death of Mahsa Amini represented the trigger, the element that generated the anger under the impulse of which young people took to the streets, But it is an anger built up by years of frustration, especially from an economic point of view, for the crisis that has affected the country for several years, for the high unemployment rate that affects especially young people and especially in some areas of the country and for the lack of real opportunities professional, due to the difficulty of being able to become independent from families and to have their own home. It is a set of factors that have added up over time and that has generated a very strong discontent. There had been huge expectations from Iranian society and younger people during the last presidential administration led by Rouhani in anticipation of the shape of the nuclear deal with the international community, the JCPOA, hence the possibility of seeing the economy restart. and to be able to benefit from all that would be achieved in economic terms and in terms of employment. This was lacking and therefore contributed to generating discontent. Even these latest attempts to revive the JCPOA, the delays in signing and the prospects at this time certainly not encouraging to be able to see the agreement actually signed have strongly contributed to arousing discontent and to blaming the new government represented by the most conservative forces in the world. inside the country.
What about the Iranian economy? What is the current picture?
The Iranian economy is in a critical situation. There is no problem in the supply of essential goods, it is not an emergency situation in terms of the interests of the population The real problem is one of perspective: there is a lack of investments, there is a lack of capacity to express the great economic potential of the country, the oil industry, that of gas, the development potential of the industrial sector. As long as the sanctions are in force, as long as it is not possible to interact with the international community in order to develop economic projects, all these potentials will risk being nullified. There is now great expectation for Iran's entry into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, for all that could ensue in terms of economic development, but it must be said that entry into the SCO can give Iran those prospects that on the contrary, it would have given the signature of the JCPOA, its full capacity for development thanks to the interaction with the western economic system. This has been lacking and therefore at this moment it is difficult to predict what the economic trend will be.
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/iran-proteste-intervista-pedde/ on Tue, 27 Sep 2022 05:49:45 +0000.