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What we have learned, and what we will never know, about the Prigozhin mutiny

What we have learned, and what we will never know, about the Prigozhin mutiny

What is Wagner and who is Prigozhin. The analysis of Francesco D'Arrigo, director of the Italian Institute of Strategic Studies "Niccolò Machiavelli"

The PMC Wagner rebellion exposed some of the systemic weaknesses of the Kremlin's crisis management strategy. While the consequences are still unclear, Yevgeny Prigozhin's actions may have set in motion a chain of events beyond President Putin's control.

Russia is in turmoil, despite stringent censorship and laws requiring the arrest of anyone who voices the slightest dissent about the "special military operation", although critics of President Putin who have not expatriated over time have been arrested, disappeared or, worse, have been "committed suicide" by falling out of a window or by poisoning, the Russian president's grip on power is faltering. In a shocking sequence of events, the semblance of absolute control that the Russian leader has maintained throughout his very long dominance is rapidly crumbling on live TV. The crisis triggered by the Wagner militia mutiny in recent hours has reached new heights: what was considered the third most powerful army in the world appeared to be on the verge of collapse, as fratricide looms and factional warfare intensifies.

The ability that was believed to be the absolute strength of the president who wanted to reconstitute the Soviet Union – total control of power – seems to be no longer within his prerogatives. The mutiny of a mercenary militia, led by an ex-convict and his friend and servant, has revealed to the whole world that his army, among the most feared in the world before the invasion of Ukraine, has not stopped an uprising that has even received the support of Russian citizens. Between a weakened Putin and a frustrated military, a perfect storm looms for the destabilization of the political and military chain of command.

The Prigozhin Mutiny: What We Discovered, What We Have Yet to Understand, and What We'll Never Know

Much is obscure and will probably never be clarified about the reasons for the June 23 "mutiny" of the Wagner Group against the Russian Military Staff. But if the media channels that relaunch the Kremlin's propaganda try to represent Prigozhin's "march of justice" as an incident that was immediately returned, we must not forget that "dezinformacija and active measures" are strategic assets of influence and cognitive warfare massively used by the Kremlin in the Putin era, both against Russian citizens and Western democracies.

The Russian Armed Forces are a "command and control" army and the war against Ukraine is being managed from the Russian base in Rostov. The Wagner Group led by its commander Yevgeny Prigozhin, announcing and implementing what appeared to be a real "Valkyrie Operation", captured without receiving any resistance, the Russian Operations Command Center in Rostov-on Don Ukraine. By taking control of the headquarters of the Russian army, in addition to causing enormous difficulties to the regular army troops on the Russian front, he effectively ousted the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Sergei Shoigu and the Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov. He basically proclaimed himself the commander of the Russian army.

What is coming to light, also thanks to US intelligence, is that all Prigozhin's maneuvers would have been known to the Russian security services, but a prevailing systemic culture and the fear of retaliation that avoids bringing bad or difficult news to the president to handle, could mean that President Putin was unaware of all the machinations going on between the General Staff and Wagner. Exactly as was the case with the decisions taken in the period before the Ukrainian war and after. This could mean that the degree of information provided by his Intelligence and part of those around him is incomplete or incorrect, or that he does not trust and sometimes makes decisions without considering them.

According to US intelligence there are signs that other Russian generals may also have supported Prigozhin's attempt to forcibly change the leadership of the Russian Defense Ministry. Prigozhin would never have launched his revolt had he not received assurances that others in positions of power would come to his aid.

Did General Surovikin, former commander of all Russian troops and military forces engaged in the conflict in Ukraine (torpedoed by Putin and Shoigu), know of the mercenary leader's rebellion plans? Did Yevgeny Prigozhin's Wagner have support from the Russian military in its capture of the Russian Operations Command Center in Rostov Ukraine?

President Putin, directly threatened in his leadership, while opening the doors of the Russian army to Wagner militiamen, who can only sign a contract to place themselves under the orders of the Defense Ministry, return to their families or flee to Belarus, is trying to understand if Gen. Sergei Surovikin and other members of the Armed Forces helped plan Prigozhin's actions last weekend. It would be the signal that the rift that has characterized the internal struggle between the Russian military leaders since the beginning of Putin's war in Ukraine is incurable.

Ultimately, the aborted coup d'état will have enormous repercussions in the struggle between the factions within Russia, which still today manage power in all 15 former Soviet republics and throughout Eastern Europe, bearers of different interests and at sometimes hostile to each other. The general assumption is that although the Government Forces are undoubtedly stronger than Prigozhin and his (alleged) 25,000 troops, the Wagner rebellion was stopped by President Putin before being crushed in blood. But the agreement reached by Prigozhin with the mediation of the Belarusian president Alexandr Lukashenko has a very high cost precisely for Putin's leadership and leaves open many uncertainties about the future of all the interpreters of this crisis, about the trajectory that the war in Ukraine will take and about the future of Russia.

What is Wagner?

Officially, Private Military Companies (PMCs) are illegal in Russia, which gives the Kremlin the opportunity to repress them, as President Putin established today, imposing on Wagner the classification in the defense departments after the failed coup of 23 June. The group, such as it is, first appeared in Ukraine in 2014, where it assisted the Russian military in annexing Crimea. Ukraine was essentially the official launch operation of the Wagner Group . Since then, a web of paramilitaries and businesses has branched out in Syria – where they fought in support of incumbent President Bashar al-Assad and secured a foothold in the country's energy sector – as well as in Libya, Sudan, Madagascar, Mozambique and Central African Republic. African activities which, as we are seeing with human trafficking in the Mediterranean, also represent a threat to Italian national security.

The Wagner name encompasses a network of businesses and mercenary groups connected by a series of overlapping ownership and logistical networks. The entities that make up this network have been described in US Treasury sanctions designations as criminal transactional organizations engaged in a wide range of activities, including working to quell pro-democracy protests, spreading disinformation, gold and diamond mining and engaging in paramilitary activities.

Russian PMCs attracted global attention when they participated in the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine and the most prominent of all Russian PMCs is the Wagner Group, led (until June 23) by Kremlin-linked businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin , who shot into the limelight of Western media when he said his group would try to assassinate the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky. The Wagner Group is thus an umbrella organization for multiple entities, principals and missions. During the Russian invasion of Ukrainian territory that began in March 2022, in particular areas of Donbass the operational role of the Wagner Group increased to surpass that of the Russian army.

The exact composition of the Wagner is not entirely clear, as the society operates in secret and does not reveal its members or hierarchy. However, it is believed to be mostly made up of ex-military and Russian intelligence personnel. This is not a unique or troubling case, as the Navy Seals, Marine Corps, and the United States Army in general also fuel the private military industry. Most of the British PMCs are led by former military commanders of the British forces, after all, only among the ex-servicemen can one find the necessary experience for organizations of this type.

It has been established that active members of the Russian military (including special forces) have been reinforcing Wagner's front lines lately. This contributes to the complexity of the recognized/unofficial/grey area nexus. Wagner has also been reported to be recruiting mercenaries from pro-Russian communities in Belarus, Moldova and Serbia.

Wagner's rise has meant increased competition from other agencies and Russian political elites. Whether it is the heads of intelligence agencies, political personalities, business leaders, military commanders, Chechens, Russians or Ukrainians, the competition within the Kremlin, also in anticipation of the post-Putin period, will be increasingly accentuated both to obtain contracts, funding and power, both in anticipation of the 2024 presidential election.

Why does Russia use PMCs, even though they are illegal?

The reasons that make Russia resort to using private military organizations rather than government ones are not known but always include some strategic objectives and many advantages:

  • Money – someone makes millions on it.
  • Foreign Policy Flexibility – Illegal activities in unallocated gray areas can quickly complete operations of any kind, particularly in those regions of the world where results and speed of intervention are a priority, not ethics.
  • No loss of regular servicemen – avoid previous mistakes such as those made in Afghanistan, with thousands of children killed and maimed, which turned public opinion against governments, demanding their unconditional withdrawal.
  • Lack of attribution – the identification that allows "analyzing the DNA" of the instigator of a given operation, to elaborate an adequate action of deterrence or retaliation against the real enemy, guaranteeing a suitable contrast action. If the attribution is questionable or wrong, retaliation can cause further friction and conflict.
  • Purpose – the use of military personnel for work outside their intended purpose causes public dissent and hostility. In this way, moreover, the military are free to carry out more institutional tasks, increasing their prestige.
  • Military innovation and emulation – this is a well known international phenomenon and the US and UK demonstrated in Iraq how useful PMCs have been to their operations. In 2008, Defense Minister Anatolii Serdiukov initiated a radical reform of the Russian Armed Forces. In part, it was a project of technological innovation that was inspired by the reforms that took place in many Western countries after the end of the Cold War, but also by the return of Russia to the superpower scene. However, with President Putin in power, the reconstitution of the army also marked the re-emergence of Russian revanchism and the beginning of the theory of hybrid warfare: Georgia 2008, Crimea and Donbas 2014, Syria 2015 and today Ukraine again.

Who is Yevgeny Prigozhin?

The hub that connects the worldwide network of Russian PMCs is Yevgeny Prigozhin, until June 23 a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who initially denied any connection with the Wagner Group or with the Russian Defense Ministry, from which he blatantly supported financially and militarily. The Wagner Group has been sanctioned by the United States for operations in Africa and for funding the Internet Research Agency, better known as the troll factory, which interfered in the 2016 and 2018 US elections .

Unlike other Russian oligarchs who made their money off energy and finance, Prigozhin's empire began with a sausage wholesaling business in 1990s St. Petersburg, where Wladimir Putin was then a city ​​mayor's adviser. In the late 1990s, Prigozhin opened a restaurant that Putin frequented early in his presidential term, often in the company of visiting foreign personalities, including US President George W. Bush. He then expanded into the catering sector, winning lucrative contracts to supply the Kremlin, schools and the Russian military, earning him the nickname "Putin's chef".

Prigozhin, who has no military background, is an individual with no competence to manage an international network of paramilitary or political influence operations. But his background as a contractor with the Russian Defense Ministry and his friendship with President Putin landed him the role of go-between to disguise this type of Russian state activity.

The first signs of intolerance and disobedience by Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin were initially seen as a staging to put pressure on the generals who had to give him resources to carry on the war in Ukraine. But with the Wagner mutiny, the head of the Kremlin has been forced to acknowledge that the main Command Center of Russian operations in Ukraine is no longer controlled by the Russian military, but by ruthless mercenary militia who have refused to submit to the control of those generals who Prigozhin holds responsible for the failed conquest of Kiev. It is likely that Wagner has been planning this rebellion for some time and in cahoots with other military organizations. And this would also explain the recent air attack on a camp of Wagner soldiers in the forest, which would have been the trigger for the "march of justice" on Rostov and then Moscow. A “false flag” attack, given that the Russian Defense Ministry denies being the perpetrator?

History teaches us that rebellions never end well and this one is no exception. It is very probable that the Russian political power system, as we knew it in the Putinian era, will suffer enormous shocks in an attempt to regain the support of its Armed Forces. The only certain thing at this moment is represented by the fact that Yevgeny Prigozhin seems to be concentrated on safeguarding his life, his personal interest and looking for a way out, and this could also be the case for President Putin and many other exponents of his Government.

(1-continued; part 2 will be published tomorrow)


This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/prigozhin-colpo-stato-russia-domande-dubbi/ on Wed, 28 Jun 2023 08:51:16 +0000.