How Turkey gasses between Egypt and Israel
What happens on energy and not only between Turkey, Egypt and Israel. The in-depth analysis by Michele Scarpa
A fluid international politics, a Turkey looking for friends in a multi-faceted part of the world that does not seem to have peace. On the eve of the Turkish-Greek meeting, it seems that Ankara wants to understand which actors in the energy match of the Eastern Mediterranean it can play with.
If relations with Greece have practically always been tense , on the contrary the tensions are only increasing due to the disputes over the waters of the Aegean, Egypt and Israel seem possible interlocutors .
From the Egyptian side, the opening looks fragile. Despite Çavuşoğlu's recent declarations of intent, Egyptian journalistic sources indicate that Cairo places conditions that are difficult to accept for Turkey in return for the normalization of diplomatic relations and the demarcation of maritime borders.
The Egyptian newspaper al Watan (close to the government) talks about an Egyptian request for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Libya, from northern Syria and non-intervention in Iraq, plus the recognition of international maritime law and the contrast to the propaganda of the Muslim brothers. If these indiscretions were found, the request would be decidedly unacceptable for Turkey and would skip any negotiating table with Egypt.
The other country Turkey is trying to build a friendly relationship with is Israel. Even Tel Aviv, after years of tension, says it is ready to cooperate with Turkey on the gas issue in the Eastern Mediterranean. This is what emerges from the speech on Wednesday 10 March by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the Likud party, during an electoral event in Bat Yam (in central Israel).
“Yes, we are in contact with Turkey. This is good news ”, said the Israeli prime minister, also claiming that Tel Aviv is in contact with the various countries involved in the Mediterranean energy match.
Netanyahu's phrases are not accidental since they come in a delicate period for Israel that is about to go to vote, on March 23, in the midst of the pandemic, in a fierce competition between political parties and in a country with a very attentive population. to foreign policy.
The news of the diplomatic thaw with the Turkish neighbor was anticipated by the Minister of Energy, Yuval Steinitz, who on 9 March during a visit to Cyprus, spoke to the press of Tel Aviv's intention to cooperate with Ankara. Israel had previously had contacts with Turkey to cooperate on Mediterranean gas, albeit without success. It now appears that the situation is at a turning point. Steinitz went so far as to wish Ankara's participation in the Eastern Mediterranean Forum (created in 2019 and which brings together: Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Palestine and Italy).
So far we are still in the field of declarations.
The relationship between Israel and Turkey was a strategic relationship for the whole Middle East at least until 2008, when Israel initiated Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip. From then on, a succession of tensions that culminated in 2010 with the case of the Mavi Marmara, one of the six ships of the Freedom flotilla that tried to force the Israeli blockade on the waters of Gaza imposed since 2007. The ship's crew at the time of The boarding of the Israeli forces reacted, nine sailors died, including eight Turks, and some Israeli soldiers were injured.
The diplomatic worsening followed the mutual accusations between the two states on the guilt and motives of the assault.
On the one hand Erdoğan was in the ascendant phase and wanted to set Turkey as a model for a new political Islam in the area (also riding the Palestinian cause), on the other hand Israel continued the hard-line policy against Hamas in the Strip.
From that moment on, relations between the two countries have gone through ups and downs until today when the two needed to open a constructive dialogue on the complex energy match of the eastern Mediterranean.
In these waters, massive gas fields have been discovered (for a total of 2100 billion m³) divided mainly between Egypt, Israel and Cyprus. Turkey wants to enter this energy game both by trying to prevent the construction of the EastMed gas pipeline (which would transport the gas directly to Italy) and by trying to have the sovereignty of Northern Cyprus and its territorial waters recognized (Northern Cyprus was occupied by Ankara in 1974, declared itself an independent republic, it is recognized only by Turkey).
Israel has found two large deposits in its own waters: Tamar (318 billion m³) and Leviathan (450 billion m³), plus three other minor ones (including Yishai bordering the Cypriot Aphrodite field). With these quantities of gas, Tel Aviv would not only be able to meet its energy needs but could also export it. This is why the interest in Turkey which, in addition to being a country in need of energy, also has the Tanap – Tap structure useful for transporting gas to Europe.
Should this collaboration attempt fail, Israel still has a makeshift strategy. The Jewish State, through the mouth of the Minister of Energy, Steinitz, announced that it would also support the EastMed gas pipeline project, which in the Israeli vision would connect Greece and Italy. In addition, Israel has also commercially strengthened ties with Greece and Cyprus, an example being connected to their respective electricity grids. It also reached an agreement with Nicosia to settle a dispute that had lasted for nine years: the border of the Israeli gas field of Yishai coinciding with the border of the Aphrodite gas field.
In this area, not only thaw diplomacy is being carried out, but also muscle demonstrations. On the one hand Tel Aviv talks with Turkey, on the other hand it continues naval exercises with Greece.
Last in time is the participation of the Israeli navy in the “Noble Dina” naval exercise, maneuvers that involved gray ships from Israel, Greece, France and Cyprus.
Turkey, desperate for room to maneuver, between diplomacy and military pressure (as in the case of the explorer ship Oruc Reis), seems to be on the corner. In fact, Israeli openings do not mean a stable political alliance but perhaps nothing more than a commercial agreement. Even with Egypt there are more tables where the two countries are opposed more than the areas of possible cooperation. As for Greece and Cyprus, the margins for action are really reduced due to the Turkish claims on the Aegean islands (see the results of these two days of talks) and historical enmities that have never subsided. The Eastern Mediterranean is simmering: on the horizon a geopolitical tsunami in the Mediterranean over a "sea" of gas?
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/energia/come-si-gasa-la-turchia-tra-egitto-ed-israele-nel-mediterraneo/ on Tue, 16 Mar 2021 10:23:20 +0000.