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Pension equalization hypothesis for 2023 and 2024: a de facto balance sheet

2 years ago babelfish

Pension equalization hypothesis for 2023 and 2024: a de facto balance sheet

Pensions: critical and documentary observations on the 2023 Budget bill. The speech by Carlo Sizia, Stefano Biasioli and Michele Poerio from Confedir and Federspev

The finance bill currently being drafted provides for a sharp "cut" on the revaluation of gross pensions over €2,102/month (4 times the INPS minimum), in particular on pensions over €5,253/month (10 times the INPS minimum of 525, €38).

And so, only for pensions up to 4 times the aforementioned minimum (€2,102 gross/month) would the 2023 revaluation be 100% (which, according to the provisional assessments of ISTAT and provisionally implemented by the Mef, would be equivalent to +7.3% ), while for pensions of an amount between €2,102 and €2,627 (4 to 5 times the minimum) the revaluation drops to 80% of the entire amount of the pension, ie + 5.84%; for those between 2,627 and 3,152 € (5 to 6 times the minimum) the revaluation drops to 55%, i.e. + 4.01%; for those between 3,152 and 4,203 (6 to 8 times the minimum) the revaluation stops at 50%, i.e. + 3.65%; for those between €4,203 and €5,253 (8 to 10 times the minimum), the revaluation drops to 40%, i.e. +2.92%; finally, for the sixth pension band (those over €5,253 gross, i.e. over 10 times the INPS minimum) the revaluation stops at 35%, ie + 2.55%.

This equalization system is clearly pejorative compared to the consolidated mechanism referred to in law 388/2000 (restored by the Draghi government for 2022) and instead takes up the criterion of law 147/2013 (Letta government), in fact the increase takes place ( and in a decreasing percentage) on the basis of the entire amount of the pension enjoyed, rather than in a separate measure (that is, in stages) for the different amounts of a single pension, guaranteeing at least the full revaluation of a portion of the same.

Even assuming (and not granted) that it was logical to switch from staggering the current revaluation by three percentages (100%, 90%, 75% respectively for pensions up to 4 times the minimum, between 4 and 5 times the minimum and beyond 5 times) to the next 6 social security income bands with a single and growing percentage reduction on the entire amount, this has led to the paradox that, for example, for pensions over 10 times the minimum, the revaluation for the next two years would stop at 2.55% compared to the established devaluation indices, while with the percentage staggering divided into 3 or 6 percentage classes, it would have allowed at least the recovery from about 4 to 6%, depending on the breakdown into 6 or 3 classes and the amount of one's pension, compared to the 7.3% envisaged only for pensions up to 4 times the minimum.

But what is the point of guaranteeing equalization (which should ensure the substantial invariance of the purchasing power of one's social security income) when the recovery is ensured in 2023, with at least a year's delay, for pensions over 10 times the INPS minimum , of 35% of the devaluation recorded (+2.55% compared to 7.3%), with the aggravating circumstance that the measure we criticize is valid for the two-year period 2023 and 2024, i.e. in a period of high devaluation, even in double digits in the last months of 2022, confirming the underestimation of +7.3 of the recovery expected today, subject to adjustment at the beginning of 2024?

And what about the fact, for example, that pensioners between 4 and 5 times the minimum, compared to colleagues between 5 and 6 times the minimum, by virtue of the bizarre revaluation criteria in question (which we contest), which set for almost 2% more revaluation, will they probably find themselves at the end of the next two years with a higher pension than those who, in their working life, have had greater wages, contributions, responsibilities and merits? What about the principle, repeatedly reaffirmed by the Court, that a pension is nothing but deferred remuneration and that remuneration requires proportionality with respect to the quality and quantity of work?

At the end of 2024 (if the assumptions of revaluation of medium-high pensions are confirmed) we will be able to say with certainty that in the last 17 years (2008-2024) these pensions have not been revalued, or significantly under-revalued, in 13 of the aforementioned years ( 76.47% in the period): this persistence by legislators has made the middle class and the ruling classes discriminated against in terms of social security revaluation, regardless of the Court's warnings about the recurrence of measures of suspected illegitimacy. And we will have to bring the matter to the Court again, unfortunately, if it is not remedied.

Naturally, we believe it is legitimate to aim for an increase in minimum pensions, even beyond 7.3%, but the resources must derive from general taxation, not from cuts in the revaluation of medium-high pensions: in this case it would be a question of a patrimonial in fact on pensions, without even the guarantees of the generality of the tax levy and its proportionality, with evident discrepancies between real and consolidated acquired rights and virtual, presumed, promised rights. Furthermore, the budget balances, still in the adjustment phase, show no osmosis between cuts in medium-high pensions and minimum pensions to be increased, even in the face of dubious work, or in any case inadequate contributions.

Finally, on a strictly political level, it is possible that the representatives of the Meloni Government do not realize that the holders of medium-high social security benefits:

  • do they belong to the category of taxpayers who contribute largely to the IRPEF revenue, and most of the increases granted will go back to the tax authorities?;
  • do they not take advantage of "discounts on the bill", or other gifts or regards?;
  • are they not ordinarily affected by cuts in the "tax wedge" or by other forms of tax relief?;
  • do they often pay for health services out of their own pockets, even those that should be public and free?;
  • is it precisely their traditionally most loyal constituents, who today are repaid in this way?;
  • no longer believe in the "fig leaf" of "solidarity", behind which politicians hide, given that it is a matter of imposed and repeated coercion?;
  • they know they are "fragile subjects by definition": for reasons of age (over 70 or 80 years old); for multiple pathologies; due to disability; for having to support an often insufficient welfare system in favor of children and grandchildren, etc., etc.?;
  • finally, they cannot believe that worse could have been done than the Letta Government (2013), which the cut in the revaluations of medium-high pensions (over 9 times the minimum) had limited to – 40% (instead of – 35%) , by a centre-right government, while the attack on the middle class and the leading categories is usual (or was it?) by the catholic-communist ideology according to which even the rich, pardon "less poor", must cry (remember Bertinotti)?. But at least, in Letta's time, the devaluation was less high and the discrimination less excruciating.

So think again, Government and Parliament, because consensus is easy to acquire (with references to coherence, the valorisation of merit, promises of change) but just as easy to lose when promises become disillusionments and facts do not confirm words. Ask your colleagues who have already started this path backwards, certainly not very glorious!

This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/economia/perequazione-2023-2024-patrimoniale/ on Wed, 30 Nov 2022 08:01:59 +0000.