What is Navalny’s real project?
What will the oligarchs do in Russia after Navalny's return? Stefano Graziosi's post for East Side Report
I was wrong about Navalny. I thought he would not return to Moscow, as it was evident that at best he would be in prison. It would have been comfortable and safe for him, and for the family, to be in Germany, or elsewhere, in London or Washington. Associate in some way with other luxury exiles such as Khodorkovsky, Kasparov, Kara Murza and so on, who try to fight the Putin regime from afar. But in this way, just like the aforementioned, he would have ended up too far from the real games, with no possibility of influencing what happens in Moscow. Drums beating far from the Kremlin are not listened to much by the Russians.
The move to return home was therefore an act of courage, not only political, but also of desperation, because only in this way, ending up in the lion's den with the risk of being torn apart, did he still maintain the possibility of somehow affecting the Russian events. Navalny has chosen to fight, to challenge Vladimir Putin once again, hoping to drag with him not only the voters who are tired of the system, who are still many, but some pieces of the establishment without which it will not be possible to change anything.
The problem is that at the moment there don't seem to be any outlets that lead to a similar outcome. Ten years ago, during the protests of winter 2011/2012, the extra-parliamentary opposition, extremely varied (from pseudo liberals to anarchists), had found some support among those who were looking for a loophole in the Putinian system. Oligarchs like Prokororov and old foxes like Kudrin had winked at Navalny and Udalzov. In Moscow 100 thousand people took to the streets, then the "march of the millions" hoped for by Navalny and his associates (the usual Kasparovs, Kasyanovs and the like) had ended as expected in thin air. The opposition had not coagulated, the Antiputin glue too weak, no concrete project. And goodnight.
Things today are no different. Of course, the Putin system has aged, Vladimir Vladimirovich's Russia (more arbitrus than dominus, as opposed to the western vulgate that knows no other player on the Russian stage than the president, while VVP has always been a moderator among the various power groups that they supported and support it) is also going through a complicated economic moment due to their own faults (the usual discourse on the delays of modernization), Covid puts a strain on the economy and society and the international framework, on the Western front, is anything but in favor of the Kremlin; But Navalny has no new allies or new weapons.
Relying on the backslapping of the West and Putin's tired generations without a program other than the fight against corruption (for heaven's sake, great, but it's like campaigning against the mafia in Italy, there is no one who declare against), moreover from prison, is a bit 'bit. The first wave of protests, which brought 4 thousand people to the streets in Moscow for the police, 40 thousand for the generous press agencies that fuck each other (plausible about 20 thousand), was not decisive. One million people in Moscow, the 2012 target, would already be something else. We'll see.
The problem is the lack of allies and the fact that the elections for the Duma are in September. Navalny does not have a party, smart voting, regardless of what has been read about it in the Western press (with newspapers and journalists who seem to have become real press offices) is a technique that leaves the time it finds. The virtual square has been enlarged, FB, Twitter, Instagram, Telegram and Tiktok have become essential tools for mobilization, but at the end of the fair if you want to overthrow a regime you have to take to the streets in person, that is to make a revolution (armed, see Maidan ).
How does it come out? The Kremlin has two possibilities, in theory: free Navalny, with all that goes with it, or keep him behind bars, again with consequences. Plus a third: free him, but expel him from Russia. The issue is not only internal, it also has an international dimension: it has become so in the Western propaganda media wave, in the US, which has made the Navalny case an instrument to put pressure on Russia, see sanctions and Nord Stream 2 under the heading. how evident this is, just think of the fact that if the Kremlin puts an opponent in jail (or kills him, it does the same), they invoke respect for human rights and apply sanctions, if instead someone gives the order to do so in Riyadh a journalist in pieces continues business as usual, with all due respect to the European parliament and pennivendoli that go to alternating current depending on what the boss's voice suggests.
The case of Mikhail Khodorkosvky, imprisoned, pardoned and emigrated, or even of Yulia Tymoshenko in Ukraine, teaches that the solutions for an authoritarian regime can be different. Since we are talking about Russia and Putin is holding the ball, I would suggest looking at the former. At least for the outcome. In this election year, Putin cannot afford an opponent like Navalny free at home: either he closes it by burying the key for a while, or he uses it as a bargaining chip. And here the donkey falls. The European Union had asked for Tymoshenko's release as a condition for the signing of the Association Agreement. We know how it ended. Assuming that Putin is not a fool like Yanukovych, we will have to see what the movements under the counter will be (Zakhar stayed in Germany? Will Dad come back there? Sputnik 5? Nord Stream?).
In Moscow there are those who ask for Navalny's head (who wanted him already dead for some time, people to whom Putin most likely gave the green light directly or indirectly, in the sole role of arbitrrus a little, voluntarily, distracted) in spite of those who would like more moderate solutions. It is difficult to find the square of the circle: I think, however, that if a compromise cannot be found (Navalny free, but in exile), the Kremlin will choose to use the Khodorkovsky method now. After all, the immediate consequence, in addition to the usual round of individual sanctions, could be the stop to Nord Stream 2, which in any case would do more harm to Germany than to Russia.
Russian gas, with the route under the Baltic halved, will still flow into Europe for the next four years again via Ukraine, as per contracts. The illusion of Brussels and the usual naive ones will be that of having avoided importing energy from the Empire of Evil, only to drink from champions of Aliyev-style democracy. And Putin will do some more business to the east, where at least they don't play hypocrites.
Article published on eastsidereport.info
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/qual-e-il-vero-progetto-di-navalny/ on Sat, 30 Jan 2021 16:40:45 +0000.