Will Orban’s re-election complicate the EU line on Russia and China?
What Viktor Orban's election victory in Hungary means for the European Union's foreign policy. The article by geostrategic analyst Francesco Galietti, founder of Policy Sonar
Is the eastern flank of the European Union compromised? Are fifth Sino-Russian columns on the Danube paralyzing the decision-making mechanisms of Europe, NATO and all the other multilateral platforms of which Budapest is a part? These are some of the reflections circulating in the aftermath of Viktor Orban's electoral victory in Hungary. Many, then, compare Orban's success to the victory of the pro-Russian Aleksandar Vucic in Serbia. However, Vucic is not part of the EU. It is, at most, ante portas , while Orban is intra moenia .
Let's come to Orban: there is no doubt that in recent years he has accentuated his curvature towards Moscow and Beijing, and that his bulky figure recurs in conversations in Brussels and in the main Western media. It is equally obvious that Orban's victory is a cold shower for those who hoped for his quick exit from the scene. However, votes in hand, it is not an option given, and all that remains is to reopen the Orban-dossier. At present, it is possible to distinguish four different types of attitudes.
There are those who ask for an iron fist. This is the approach of those who ask to further marginalize Orban, who has been 'behind the blackboard' for years. At the moment, however, the expulsion of Hungary from the EU or NATO is not at all on the agenda, and at most there are calls, such as that of Gideon Rachman in the Financial Times, to increase the pressure on Orban. Budapest also continues to be part of other multilateral platforms, such as the Three Seas Initiative, whose center of impetus and main financier remains the United States.
There are those who rejoice. Applauding Orban today is above all those who, in Europe and also in Italy, see in his victory the substantial stability of the sovereign bloc, declining for some time in the rest of the Old Continent. As if to say that, with sovereignty, it will instead have to be reckoned and come to terms. But it is a hasty reading full of expectations, which most of the time betrays the insecurity of those in our area who feel the ground collapsing under their feet.
There are those who trust in a providential 'mutation' of Orban. In fact, Orban turns out to be a chameleon who has changed register numerous times over the course of his political career. As a university student, he spent a few months in Oxford benefiting from a George Soros scholarship. Soros was in turn the financier of Fidesz, the alliance of young democrats set up by Orban. Water under the bridge: the partnership between Orban and Soros has been broken for some time, their hostility is widely known, and today Orban is the most conspicuous icon of Putinism within the European forum. The impression, however, is that the search for domestic consensus, in Orban, always prizes ideology. Orban, in other words, can change his skin again if he thinks it suits him.
Finally, there are those who keep the hatches open with Budapest. This is the case of Macron, who showed a certain cordiality during the official meeting with Orban at the end of last year at the Elysée, as well as in March of last year, on the sidelines of the EU Council summit. Even more nuanced appears the position of Germany, which however remains the main economic reference of the entire eastern flank of the Union and is by far the first destination for Hungarian exports. The numbers speak for themselves: in 2020, Hungary exported goods and services to Germany for about thirty billion euros, almost six times the volume of exports to the second destination (Slovakia). Germany, therefore, has the strongest arguments over Orban. Among other things, the hypothesis that the Chinese, who have made massive investments in Hungary, could infinitely increase their support for Orban seems less likely today. Just as the EU has come together in defense of Lithuania, subject to economic retaliation by China, so Chinese support for Orban would translate into a further gap between China and the EU. Just what Beijing is trying to avert in every way (and without particular success).
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/orban-europa/ on Sun, 17 Apr 2022 06:27:30 +0000.